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The instant case extends the principle no further than the
court had previously gone in protecting such other interest as
that recognized in the right to picket even on the property of the
employeri 9 and that recognized in allowing an employee to solicit
uhion membership upon the employer's property. 20  The court
has experienced no difficulty in preventing this interference.
A distinction is noted between the invasion of private pidp-
ei'ty for commercial ends and an invasion in the furtherance of
religious principles. The attitude of the courts makes it clear
that the advertiser and Fuller Brush salesman will not be af-
forded the same protection granted the colporteur and the pick-
eteer.2 1 The explanation of this distinction derives from the
types of interests being protected.
It remairs to be seen to what extent freedom of religion and
expression will brush aside private property concepts. The ques-
tion as it now stands cannot be considered as finally settled, for
the Supreme Court is split on this general issue and a change of
personnel may bring with it a change in constitutional interpreta-
tion with respect to this question.
GEORGE D. ERNEST, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW-BURGLARY IN THE NIGHTTrnvm-Defendant was
convicted on a charge of breaking and entering in the nighttime
with intent to steal.' The sole witness testified that the defend-
ant broke and entered the burglarized apartment "at night"
"between six and seven." Upon further interrogation she de-
clared that the breaking and entering was at the time of day
when it is "just getting dark." Official records show that the sun
set at 8:04 p.m. on the day of the burglary. The siipreme court
upheld the jury's finding tiat the crime had been committed
after sunset. Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice Higgins dissented
on the ground that the witness' testimony clearly showed the
breaking and entering to have been in the daytime. State v. Mc-
Donell. 23 So. (2d) 230 (La. 1945).
i9. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736; 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) is
illustrative of this right.
20. Republic Aviation. Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board
324 Uq.S. 793, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 914 (1945).
21. See cases cited supra note 6.
1. The offense had been committed prior to the effective date of the
Criminal Code; and the prosecution, therefore, was under Section 851 of the
Revised Statutes as amended by La. Act 71 of 1926. This statute was super-
seded by Art. 60, La. Crim. Code of 1942, and the offense is now designated
as "burglary in the nighttime."
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One of the essential elements of common law burglary was
breaking and entering in the nighttime. According to Blackstone:
"the malignity of the offense does not so properly arise from
its being done in the dark, as in the dead of night, when all
the creation, except beasts of prey, are at rest; when sleep
has disarmed the owner and rendered his castle defenceless. ''2
Although the offense may be committed at any time of day under
modern burglary statutes, almost all states, including Louisiana,3
have retained the distinction between burglary in the daytime
and burglary in the nighttime, providing a more severe penalty
for the latter offense.
In ancient days night was considered to begin with the set-
ting of the sun and ended with its rising on the next morning.
By the eighteenth century England had adopted the pragmatic
approach, defining night as that time when there was no longer
sufficient light whereby the countenance of a person could be
discerned at a reasonable distance.4  Moonlight in such cases was
not taken into consideration. No intervening time between
night and day existed-when the light of day was entirely gone,
night began. Night, in turn, terminated with earliest dawn.
This line of demarcation has become a part of our jurisprudence,5
2. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769) 224.
3. Arts. 60, 61, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
4. Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Statutory Crimes (Early's 3 ed.
1901) 303, § 276; 4 Blackstone, loc. cit. supra note 2; 3 Chitty, A Practical
Treatise on the Criminal Law (3 Am. 1836) 1105; 3 Coke, Institutes of the
Laws of England (1797) 63; 3 Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence
(1853) 70, § 75. See also authorities and cases cited in the above works.
5. The People v. Griffin, 19 Cal. 578 (1862); State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 179
(1879) (The state was permitted to introduce an almanac to show the
precise time of sunset so that the court might take judicial notice. The court
held it to be some evidence on the question of light, but adhered to its old
standard of sufficient daylight to discern the features of another.);
Petit v. Colmery, 20 Del. 266, 55 AtI. 344 (1903); Bethune v. Georgia, 48 Ga.
505 (1873); State v. Mecum, 95 Iowa 433, 436, 64 N.W. 286 (1895) (" 'nighttime'
means the time between darkness after sundown and dawn of daylight in
the morning"); Thomas v. State, 6 Miss. 20 (1840); State v. Bancroft, 10 N.H.
105 (1839); State v. Robinson & McClune, 35 N.J. Law 71 (1871); State v. Mc-
Knight, 111 N.C. 690, 16 S.E. 319 (1892); State v. Clark, 42 Vt. 629 (1870);
Nicholls v. State, 68 Wis. 416 (1887); Klieforth v. State, 88 Wis. 163, 59 N.W.
507 (1894).
The cases involving the time of day at which search warrants were is-
sued have also adhered to the common law definition of "nighttime." At-
lanta Enterprises v. Crawford, 22 F. (2d) 834 (N.D. Ga. 1927); Moore v. United
States, 57 F. (2d) 840 (C.C.A. 5th, 1932); Linnen v. Banfleld, 114 Mich. 93, 72
N.W. 1 (1897).
United States v. Llebrich, 55 F. (2d) 341, 343 (W.D. Pa. 1932), having
cited and discussed all the old cases defining "nighttime," the court concludes
that "nighttime" extends from thirty minutes after sunset to thirty minutes
before sunrise; Distefan v. United States, 58 F. (2d) 963 (C.C.A. 5th, 1932)
(cited In Chief Justice Q'Niell's dissent to the principal case).
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and is typified by Justice Sibley's statement that "daylight does
not in law or by common understanding, begin at sunrise or end
at sunset, but includes dawn at the one end and twilight at the
other."
In an effort to achieve a more precise distinction, a number
of states have essayed a statutory definition of "nighttime." In
LouisianaJ as in many states,8 "nighttime" is defined as the
period between sunset and sunrise according to the ancient test.
In a few states the legislatures have attempted to define a "night-
time" period that will be determinable with some degree of cer-
tainty and yet will not extend arbitrarily from sunrise to sunset.
In this way they hope to preserve some of the pragmatic ad-
vantages of the common law approach. They have established
a mensurable period which covers arbitrary portions of dawn
and dusk. For example, in Massachusetts9 and Wisconsin"
"nighttime" extends from one hour after sunset to one hour be-
fore sunrise, while in Texas this period is limited to thirty min-
utes.1 England ignores the varying daylight periods of the dif-
ferent seasons and defines "nighttime" as a set period from 9:00
p.m. to 6:00 a.m.1 2
The Louisiana Criminal Code and a number of other statutes
have adopted an arbitrary definition of "nighttime" instead of
the more flexible eighteenth century criterion of sufficient light
to discern a person's features at a reasonable distance. The for-
mula has the advantage of certainty, for one need only look to
the almanac to ascertain definitely that point at which the sun
In Bailey v. Shrader, 265 Ky. 663, 97 S.W. (2d) 575 (1936), a case of false
imprisonment where the town marshal had the duty of keeping the lawfully
arrested prisoner in custody until morning if arrested at night, the witness
said that it was "just about dark," and the court invoked Webster's defini-
tion of "night" as "the beginning of darkness; nightfall."
The old common law definition of "daytime," the opposite of "nighttime,"
has also been upheld in the case of prisoners claiming liberty of the yard dur-
ing the day. Trull v. Wilson, 9 Mass. 154 (1812). See also the following railroad
cases: United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 157 Fed. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1907);
United States v. Boston & W. R. R., 269 Fed. 89 (C.C.A. 1st, 1920), cert. de-
nied 255 U.S. 577, 41 S.Ct. 448, 65 L.Ed. 794 (1920).
6. Atlanta Enterprises v. Crawford, 22 F. (2d) 834, 837 (N.D. Ga. 1927).
7. Art. 60, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
8. Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 43-903; Cal. Pol. Code (Deering, 1944) § 3260;
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §§ 6673, 6681; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Anderson
and McFarland, 1936) § 11350; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hilyer, 1929) §§ 9978(19),
10319; New York Gen. Construction Laws, § 51; N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913)
§ 9881; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 21, § 1440; Ore. Code Ann. (1930) § 14-1025;
S.D. Code (1939) § 13.3708; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 103-9-7.
9. Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 278, § 10 et seq. This definition of "night-
time" is the "nighttime" of the old game laws.
10. Wis. Stat. (1937) § 4637a.
11. Tex. Ann. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1938) art. 1396.
12. (1861) 24 and 25 Vict. c. 96, § 1.
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rises or sets on a given day. Since the distinction is, at best, an
arbitrary one, it was probably considered more important to fix
the line between burglary in the daytime and burglary in the
nighttime in an unequivocal manner than to invite controversy
in the not too important issue of whether or not it was actually
dark when the offense was committed. The general distinction
between daytime and nighttime burglaries is not without some
merit, and it is so well rooted in our law that its suggested abo-
lition by the reporters who drafted the Criminal Code met with
almost universal opposition. However, it is not so sacred that a
factual definition of "nighttime," though possibly more accurate,
should have been chosen in lieu of the greater certainty inherent
in an almanac definition. At most the distinction is a vestige of
the old common law conception of the aggravated nature of a
burglary committed in the dark of night when all law-abiding
people have retired to the presumed quiet and security of their
homes.
Even with Louisiana's new statutory definition of "night-
time," difficulty will continue to arise where the exact time of the
entering is not known. By the very nature of the crime eye-wit-
nesses will seldom be found, and in their absence circumstantial
evidence will be determinative of the time of the entering.
1 3
The problem is not lessened when, as in the McDonell case, the
available eyewitnesses are not certain of the exact time of the
burglary. In such cases the court may revert to the former test
of sufficient light reasonably to discern a man's features. In two
other cases the approach adopted in the principal decision was
resorted to; testimony as to the degree of darkness was relied
upon almost entirely to establish the time of the crime. In State
v. Perkins1 a burglary victim twice testified that it was "not
light, but dark," when he awakened and discovered that his barn
had been burglarized. This testimony was given more weight
than the same man's estimate of the hour at which the crime was
committed. In California, where the statutory definition of
13. Taylor v. Territory, 7 Ariz. 224, 64 Pac. 423 (1901); People v. Lowrie,
4 Cal. App. 137, 87 Pac. 253 (1906); People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 119 Pac.
920 (1911); People v. Ross, 61 Cal. App. 61, 214 Pac. 267 (1923); People v.
Helsley, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 935, 108 P. (2d) 97 (1940); Houser v. Georgia, 58
Ga. 78 (1877); Brown v. Georgia, 59 Ga. 457 (1877); Williams v. Georgia, 60
Ga. 446 (1878); People v. Taylor, 93 Mich. 638, 53 N.W. 777 (1892); State v.
Gray, 23 Nev. 301, 46 Pac. 801 (1896); State v. Whitaker, 39 Nev. 159, 154 Pac.
927 (1916); Long v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. App. 207, 127 S.W. 208 (1910); Clark v.
State, 140 Tex. Cr. App. 25, 143 S.W. (2d) 378 (1940); State v. Miller, 24 Utah
312, 67 Pac. 790 (1902); State v. Richards, 29 Utah 310, 81 Pac. 142 (1905);
Simon v. State, 125 Wis. 439, 103 N.W. 1100 (1905); Winsky v. State, 126 Wis.
99, 105 N.W. 480 (1905); Gray v. State, 243 Wis. 57, 9 N.W. (2d) 68 (1943).
14. 342 Mo. 560, 116 S.W. (2d) 80 (1938).
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"nighttime" is "the period between sunset and sunrise,"15 the
court has held', that evidence showing entry to have been made
"in the evening sometime after dark"' 7 was clearly sufficient to
justify the jury's conclusion that the offense was committed after
sunset. Massachusetts by statute 8 similarly defines "nighttime,"
but in the tort case of Sodekson v. Lynch,19 where there was no
direct testimony as to the exact time of the injury, the court held
that night had begun at the time described by the plaintiff as
"dusk turning to dark" and at a time when she, being possessed
or normal eyesight, could not see.
According to a decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia °
the defendant will be given the benefit of the doubt where the
evidence shows that the burglary was committed within a rela-
tively short period-one-half of which was day and one-half
night. This decision is in accord with the usual policy of strict
construction of criminal statutes in favor of the accused.
The desirability of a statutory definition of "nighttime," to
be applied wherever possible, is well illustrated by the principal
case wherein Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice Higgins filed vig-
orous and well reasoned dissents based upon the theory that the
so-called "twilight period" is not included in "nighttime." Still,
this same difficulty would have been present, if the burglary had
occurred after the adoption of the Criminal Code, for there was
no direct evidence as to the precise time when the apartment was
entered thus excluding the ready availability of the almanac to
establish the nature of the crime.
NINA J. NICHOLS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SHoRT Foim INDICTMENTS-The bill of
information charged that the defendant, Davis, "did commit the
crime of gambling as defined by Article 90 of the Louisiana Crim-
inal Code." Defendant tendered a motion for a bill of particulars
which was granted and the particulars furnished. The motion
to quash the indictment and the plea of unconstitutionality were
overruled. Defendant excepted and appealed. Held, the use of
the short form, authorized by Article 235 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1928 as amended by Act 223 of 1944, was sufficient
15. Cal. Pol. Code (Deering, 1944) § 3260.
16. People v. Mendoza, 17 Cal. App. 157, 118 Pae. 964 (1911).
17. 17 Cal. App. 157, 159, 118 Pac. 964, 965.
18. Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 278, § 10 et seq.
19. 314 Mass. 161, 49 N.E. (2d) 901 (1943).
20. Caesar Water v. Georgia, 53 Ga. 567 (1875).
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